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1 The background to the debate
This article addresses the nexus between aid and
poverty reduction. It challenges the conventional
wisdom that enhanced aid is central to poverty
reduction. There is a rich literature reviewing the
impact of aid on poverty. It is now generally accepted
that unless aid flows are located within a policy
framework which is locally designed and owned
its impact on poverty reduction will be muted.
Furthermore, ownership over policy must be
backed by effective governance to enhance its
impact on poverty reduction. This argument is not
new. It originated in the critique of aid policies going
back to the early 1980s with themove by theBretton
Woods Institutions (BWI) towards policy-based
lending conditional on structural adjustment
reforms (SAR) in the less developed countries
(LDCs). It was then argued that externally driven
reforms which ignored the socio-political context
of the reform process would be unsustainable. It
was not till the late 1990s that theWorld Bank and
other donors recognised that without ownership
and improved governance their capacity to influence
reform had been minimal.
2 The PRSP process
The linkage between donor aid commitments and
poverty reduction is being expressed through the
current fashion of the Poverty Reduction Strategy
Papers (PRSP). The PRSP process is the direct
outcome of the rather belated discovery by the
donors of the importance of policy ownership as
well as the need to focus on poverty. The
development agencies have now made the PRSP
process into the touchstone for pledging aid to
the LDCs. Even the InternationalMonetary Fund
(IMF) locates its loans to LDCs within what it
terms as a Poverty Reduction Growth Facility
(PRGF).
The international development community is
using the PRSPs as ametric for their aid strategies
and are looking to the PRSP as the policy instrument
of choice to meet the Millennium Development
Goals (MGDs). The international community is
now committed to a significant increase in aid flows
in order to support their attempts to realise the
MDGs. This has opened up debate on the capacity
of particular LDCs to absorb these flows. But if aid
flows need to be married to the overarching goal
of poverty reduction, then the underlying policy
regime as well as the commitment and capacity of
the LDC governments to implement these policies
remains more relevant than the volume of flows or
the issue of absorption.
2.1 Changing trends in Bangladesh’s aid
dependence
How far is Bangladesh in need of more aid tomeet
its commitments under the MDGs and to finance
its PRSP? Bangladesh was once an aid-dependent
country. It is now a trade-dependent country. The
aid–Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratio in
Bangladesh has declined from around 10 per cent
in the 1980s to below 2 per cent in 2003/04. In
contrast, its trade-GDP ratio has risen from 21 per
cent in 1986 to 40 per cent in 2003/04.This decline
in aid dependence is captured in the decline in the
aid/investment ratio from 33 per cent in 1990/91
to 13 per cent in 2000/01 and the aid/import ratio
from 50 per cent to 15 per cent in the same period.
This decline in aid dependence reflects a fall in aid
disbursement from US$1.7bn in 1990/91 to
US$1bn in 2003/04. Part of this decline in
disbursement reflects the corresponding fall in aid
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commitments. But there is also a significant decline
in aid utilisation, which is manifested in the fact
that the aid pipeline as of June 2004 contained
US$6bn.This bloated pipeline has persisted through
the 1990s – the pipeline in 1990/91 carried around
US$6bn of unused aid. Most of the aid in the
pipeline relates to project aid. Programme aid feeds
directly into the budget and foreign exchange
reserves and is more easily absorbed in the formof
current public expenditures and imports. Such
forms of budgetary support have not remained
immune from the hazards of inappropriate as well
as ineffective use of public expenditure.
2.2 Can Bangladesh make use of
increased funding?
Even though aid flows have declined, Bangladesh
obviously does not face an immediate problem of
shortage of aid. Otherwise it would have drawn
upon its unutilised aid and used this to finance a
larger AnnualDevelopment Programme (ADP). In
practice the ADP has remained under-fulfilled for
three years and the ADP/GDP ratio has declined.
Bangladesh would thus need to be making better
use of its existing public development expenditure
to stimulate expansion in its infrastructure and
social development programmes, which could have
been possible throughmore effective use of available
aid.
In practice,most of the unused aid is available
in relation to project aid.This reflects the numerous
problems which beset the use of such aid –
including complex donor disbursement procedures
as well as attached conditionalities, slow decision
making by theGovernment of Bangladesh (GOB),
bureaucraticdelays and weak capacity to implement
projects. Part of this delay has occurred as a result
of conflicts over dividing the spoils derived from
aid-related contracts.
Donors remain preoccupied withmalfeasant use
of their aid.Bangladesh’s poor standing in the league
tables ofTransparency International has contributed
to donors’ attempts to over-regulate the use of their
aid. As with all such conflicts of interest, the
disbursement process slows aid use without
necessarily reducing the tendency for malfeasant
conduct. Under the circumstances, stepping up
project aid to invest in the infrastructure or even
the social sector would not yield significant gains
in the short run.
Current donor policy in Bangladesh has,
however, led to a downgrading of investment in
infrastructure projects in such areas as power,
telecommunications, ports and energy
development. This has, in part, originated in the
poor governance associated with some projects –
manifested in slow implementation, misuse of
funds, poor management, low efficiency and poor
maintenance. Some donors such as theWorld Bank
and some bilateral donors have advised the GOB
to seek private sector investment to develop its
infrastructure, but this has not been forthcoming,
readily or to the extent that is needed. The end
product of this de-emphasis has been a deceleration
in much needed infrastructure capacity
development whichhas impacted on the productive
sectors of the economy and has inhibited private
investment.
The donors have stepped up aid to the social
sector, especially to health and education.However,
here againmajor investments in these sectors have
reflected a slow draw-down of funds due to many
of the same problems which have constrained the
use of aid funds in the infrastructure sectors. In the
health sector, a consortium of donors committed
a substantial volumeof funds as part of an integrated
programme for the health and population sector.
However, the aid was tied to amajor reformproject
in these sectors which was weakly implemented.
The programme was then suspended by the GOB
following a change of regime after the parliamentary
elections of 2001.This contributed to low utilisation
of funds in sectors which would have had a
significant impact on human development.
Notwithstanding Bangladesh’s poor utilisation
of aid funds and associated governance problems
in the education and health sectors, its record in
meetingMDG goals in these sectors has been widely
appreciated. Its school enrolment rates have
improved with gender parity being realised at both
the primary and secondary school levels, its infant
and maternal mortality rates have declined, its
contraceptive prevalence rate has risen from below
10 per cent to over 50 per cent in the last 25 years
whereby its total fertility rate has halved, as has its
population growth rate.
These positive developments in Bangladesh’s
social sector have been registered in spite ofmassive
governance problems which afflict both the
education and health sectors, which are manifest
in the poor and possibly deteriorating quality of
service delivery.Aidmay have contributed in some
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measure to these positive human development
outcomes, but since its impact is filtered through
the system of governance, there are other variables
which have been insufficiently captured in the
analysis, which account for the improved
performance.The positive role of Bangladesh’s large
and globally recognisedNGO community may be
one such factor, but this is hardly the main
explanatory variable.
Bangladesh’s record in poverty reduction has
been positive but far from brilliant. Reduction of
poverty from around 59 per cent in 1991/92 to 50
per cent in 2000/01 ranks as a moderate
performance, but still leaves large numbers of people
in poverty and has to take account of the increase
in income inequalities in this same period. Here
again no clear explanation is at hand to account for
this poverty reduction.Weak correlations of poverty
reduction with GDP growth trends, agricultural
growth and the expansion of micro-credit do not
provide an explanation which would withstand
rigorous professional scrutiny or indeed provide
guidance to policy makers seeking to craft a poverty
reduction strategy for Bangladesh.
In such circumstances, it is difficult to come up
with a categorical response as to whether Bangladesh
could absorb a significant expansion in aid or would
be able to use this accretion of resources very
effectively. A more meaningful answer to this
question of providing increased aid would thus
need to be addressed in relation to the overall
development strategy of the GOB and its capacity
for improving governance.
3 Bangladesh’s PRSP process
The interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
(PRSP) recently completed by theGOBmay provide
some guidance in answering these questions. This
section of the article addresses the PRSP process
both in the Bangladesh context and inmore general
terms and attempts to relate this discussion to the
question of aid criteria for distributing resources
across the LDCs. The concluding part of the article
addresses the broader question of a more socially
relevant agenda for poverty reduction and its
relevance for rethinking aid strategies.
Bangladesh’s PRSP is really a substitute for a
medium-term development plan rather than a
coherent strategy for poverty reduction. In fact it
has no underlying macro-model which relates its
programmes to specific time-bound, poverty-
reducing outcomes.This is the problem withmany
other PRSPs across the world.Most of them, even
those whichdemonstrate a largely indigenous effort,
have felt compelled to incorporate the
macroeconomicmodel originating from an earlier
generation of structural adjustment reforms
imposed by the BWI. The BWI’s central goal is to
accelerate growth. Poverty reduction is seen as a
derivative of higher growth in this model. Inpractice
the BWI growth model is itself loosely structured
and its SAR policy correlates do not necessarily
assure growth. Most finance ministers from sub-
SaharanAfrica and indeed Bangladesh would testify
to my argument.
The recently completed draft of the Bangladesh
PRSP, which is a largely indigenous effort, is a
reasonably competent exercise.However, theGOB
has felt compelled to genuflect to the SAR agenda
even though its relationship to poverty reduction
is at best tenuous. I provide a sample of the policy
interventions culled from the Bangladesh PRSP to
sustain this argument:
● Maintain fiscal discipline
● Enhance efficient use of resources
● Improve monetary management by the
Bangladesh Bank
● Develop a domestic bond market
● Restructure nationalised commercial banks (this
includes privatisation)
● Reform state-owned enterprises (this includes
privatisation)
● Liberalise imports
● Create an enabling policy environment for the
private sector
● Unbundle the power sector
● Open avenues for private sector participation
in the railway sector.
All these strategies built into the PRSP
incorporate a generation of reforms whichoriginated
in theCountry Assistance Strategy (CAS) papers of
theWorld Bank and the stabilisation programmes
of the IMF over the last decade. While we may
debate the celerity of the World Bank’s import
liberalisation strategy or its indiscriminate approach
to privatisation,many of the reforms proposed in
their CAS papers are sensible and desirable for
reforming the Bangladesh economy.However, what
is relevant to our argument is the fact that many of
the policy reforms incorporated in the PRSP derived
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less from the felt needs of theGOB or the paramount
concerns of the people of Bangladesh than from the
CAS papers of theWorld Bank and a shelf load of
“grey cover” reports prepared by the Bank for
reforming the Bangladesh economy.
Nor is it clear how this reaffirmation of an
ongoing donor-derived reform strategy furthers the
goals of poverty reduction or indeed reflects the
outcome of consultations with citizens and
especially the poor. What little I know about the
PRSP process in some other SouthAsian countries
and indeed other LDCs around the world, suggests
that the universal approach to reform associated
with the SAR has found a place in the PRSPs of
countries as disparate as Nepal, Uganda, Cambodia
and Bolivia. While reforms in all these countries
remain necessary, the point at issue is the ownership
of these reforms and whether they add up to a
coherent agenda for poverty reduction.
4 The governance of aid use
It is arguable that meeting many of Bangladesh’s
MDG targets today depends less on aid and more
on the commitment of the GOB in the form of a
reprioritisation of existing public expenditure and
on improved governance.The gross enrolment ratio
for primary schools in Bangladesh is now close to
100 per cent but the net enrolment ratio is closer
to 70 per cent. Retaining children in school is not
just a matter of resources but depends heavily on
the quality of governance of the schooling system.
This relates to the capacity to discipline teachers to
take classes, increase contact hours with students
and improve the curricula and teaching methods.
If such improvements in governance were to take
place, then physical investments to upgrade the
quality of school buildings and facilities, provide
better teachingmaterials and evenmeet nutritional
MDG goals by providing schoolmeals for children,
would benefit more fully from enhanced inflows
of aid to Bangladesh.
Bangladesh’s PRSP estimates that the cost of
providing a minimally nutritious lunch to 13.5
million school age children (80 per cent of the target
population) would come to about US$245m a year.
This amounts to around 5 per cent of the total
revenue budget of about US$5bn of the GOB for
the fiscal year 2004/05 and 24 per cent of the
US$1bn of aid disbursed in 2003/04.The total cost
of a programme to provide comprehensive
sanitation to the rural areas of Bangladesh is
projected to cost US$25m in 2005 rising toUS$35m
in 2015, which is the target year for covering the
entire rural population of 68 million. It will cost
another US$18m to meet the sanitation needs of
an urban population of 37 million in 2015. These
again are not large sums of money either for the
GOB or the donor community.
In both cases – school meals and sanitation –
the sums involved for theGOB remainmanageable.
However, the operative issue will be for Bangladesh’s
aid donors to enhance their aid commitment to
accommodate these and other programmes which
can make an impact on poverty and are identified
with the MDGs. Given the current levels of aid
disbursement, this would require a sizeable increase
in aid commitment to Bangladesh to accommodate
some of these poverty reduction programmes.
However, Bangladesh’s aid utilisation remains poor
and the current aid pipeline still carries US$6bn in
unspent aid. The problem faced by the GOB is
therefore to not just attract more aid but to utilise
it both promptly and effectively.
If the GOB aspires to attract more aid to meet
theMDGs, it will need to demonstrate that it has,
for example, put in place a credible, well-supervised
programme which sees that schools across the
country are equipped to provide a nutritious meal
to schoolchildren without leakage of funds or
diversion of food at the cost of serving inadequate
meals to the children. This would involve both
enforcing transparent systems of oversight by the
government and the public over the programme,
and establishing the accountability of the school
authorities to the local community, including the
parents and the children themselves.
All such governance-related issues are duly
recognised inBangladesh’s PRSP, as in those ofmany
other LDCs.However, there is a wide gap between
registering fealty to good governance on paper and
introducing this into the actual practice of
governance. Bangladesh, as indeed most LDCs, is
not misgoverned out of ignorance of the latest
advances in the development discourse.There is an
underlying political economy which provides the
dynamic to a country’s governance. There is no
evidence that this political economy has undergone
a sea change in the post-MDG/good governance era.
Nor is the aid provided by donors really enough to
persuade those who benefit frommalgovernance in
the country to change their ways. Indeed the present
tendency of aid donors, led by the BWI, to preach
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good governance to recalcitrant LDC regimes lacks
credibility because they are rarely backed with a
sufficiency of carrots or a strong enough stick. In
Bangladesh, where current aid disbursement
accounts for less than 2 per cent of GDP, donors
have little capacity to leverage change unless the
GOB is a willing and effective partner to such change.
5 Incoherence in donor policies
The tendency by donors to dwell on the
malgovernance of the state while praising
Bangladesh’s macroeconomic fundamentals is not
a sound recipe for inducing better governance. At
a recent conference in Paris on ‘Joint Progress
towards Enhanced Aid Effectiveness’, the
Bangladesh Finance Minister suggested that aid
flows should be guided by results rather than
conditions. This also seems to be the view of the
British government, which was articulated by Mr
Hillary Benn at the same conference in Paris. This
suggests that we may be witnessing yet another
change in aid strategy, at least among some donors.
However, it is not clear if donors are still agreed
on the yardstick to evaluate good results whichmay
guide their aid priorities. There are several sets of
success indicators guiding donor policy today.These
include realising theMDGs, sustaining “satisfactory”
growth rates, and meeting rather more vaguely
defined goals of good governance.While theMDG
goals are inspired by the recent commitment to
poverty reduction and improved human
development, the growth indicators are a legacy of
the SAR era. These SAR indicators demand that
particular countries also attain macroeconomic
stability, liberalise their imports and privatise their
economies. The IMF makes the achievement of
such SAR goals conditional for accessing loans
under their PRGF.A policy regime, which was once
viewed as a means to enhance growth, has now
acquired a life of its own and has also become an
end in itself, both for the BWI as well as for some
bilateral donors.
The third set of goals relating to good governance
remains much more nebulous. They include
democracy, human rights, the rule of law, ending
corruption and greater transparency and
accountability in governance.Donors prefer to talk
about such goals but still tend to view them as
instrumental for promoting reforms rather than as
ends in themselves which will merit reward and
punishment for performance success or failure.
The problem with this multiplicity of goals and
indicators of good performance lies in the confusion
in the conceptual premise underlying these goals.
There is an assumption that high growth can only
be realised through faithful implementation of SAR
derived from the Washington Consensus. Thus
higher growth is assumed to lead to poverty
reduction, so SAR is itself seen as essential to poverty
reduction. This argument informed the World
Development Report of 1990, but seems alive and
well in 2005 and underlies the PRSP of virtually
every LDC across three continents. This
reform–poverty nexus has now beenmarried to the
proposition that good governance, including
democracy, reduced corruption etc., will promote
effective reforms, enhance growth and reduce
poverty.However, this multi-dimension perspective
provides a poor basis for driving aid strategy.
Bangladesh’s governance is recognised by donors
to be poor, and this has been articulated with
increasing stridency at recent meetings of the
BangladeshDevelopment Forum (BDF).However,
by LDC standards, Bangladesh’s record on attaining
MDGs goals, growth, poverty reduction and
macroeconomic stability is quite good – hence the
emphasis by its Finance Minister on the need for
using outcome indicators. Vietnam’s record in
growth, poverty reduction andMDG indicators is
perhaps one of the best in the world. However, in
indicators of SAR, or good governance defined by
human rights, democracy, transparency and
accountability, Vietnam would rate below
Bangladesh and indeed many LDCs.
So what conclusions do we draw about relevant
indicators to guide aid flows? Should aid donors
demand an improvement in law enforcement in
Bangladesh or a plural political system and free
elections in Vietnam before they enhance aid? Or
should donors move away from setting policy
guidelines and simply focus on the issue of aid
absorption, where againVietnam would score very
highly. Indeed it is arguable that both the enhanced
use of conditionalities, including good governance,
and confusion over performance indicators may be
inimical to the efficacy of aid absorption. It is not
surprising that many LDC governments, including
Bangladesh, argue that the best way to enhance aid
absorption is to offer it in the form of budgetary
support which should be provided on the basis of
a limited set of performance indicators associated
with growth and the realisation ofMDG goals. But
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the MDG goals are many and complex. Without
establishing priorities and weighting these goals,
it is far from clear that the MDGs can provide a
meaningful guideline for aid commitment. Nor is
it clear that donors are willing to trade off 5 per cent
growth as well as good progress in some human
development indicators with tolerance for autocratic
governance, weak rule of law, endemic corruption
and rampant crime.
The tensions in donor thinking derive from their
weak understanding of the dynamics of poverty
reduction and its relationship to growth as well as
governance. It is acceptable for academic economists
to run regressions to demonstrate that high growth
rates can be correlated to reduced poverty. While
this empirical evidencemay be debated in seminars,
it is hardly adequate to guide a Finance Minister
towards liberalising imports or privatising banks
and water supplies in the expectation that this will
result in high growth and hence poverty reduction.
Nor is it adequate to cite the works of political
scientists providing positive links between their
pet measures of good governance with poverty
reduction driven by fidelity to SAR.
A working FinanceMinister needs evidence of
a much more robust chain of causality between a
regime of well-governedpolicy reforms, with growth
and poverty reduction. In a meaningful PRSP, the
relevant indicator should be poverty reduction
where growth would serve as an instrumental
indicator. Such a move to prioritise poverty
reduction would need a fuller understanding of the
dynamics of poverty. It is argued here that poverty
originates in the structural injustices of a society.
But there is little recognition of the structural
dimensions of poverty or the evidence of policy
interventions in the PRSPs to correct the injustices
which constrain the opportunities of the poor.
6 Conclusions
6.1 Redesigning the PRSP to correct
injustice
The PRSP process needs to address the structural
dimensions of poverty if it aspires to not just reduce
but to eradicate poverty. The relevant indicators of
injustice which demand redress include the
following:
● the lack of access of the poor to productive assets
● the terms on which the poor participate in the
market economy
● the disparity in the quality of education and
health care available to the poor compared to
the elite
● the inequitable quality of governance in a society.
Strategies to eradicate poverty
Such a redirection of the PRSPs as well as aid strategy
would need to address the issue of correcting
injustice through the empowerment of the poor,
by strengthening their capacity to participate in a
market economy and a democratic polity. The
proposed policy interventions may be structured
under the following heads:
● expanding the ownership and control of the
poor over productive assets including corporate
assets
● enhancing access of the poor to a knowledge-
based society by upgrading the quality of public
education
● providing quality health care to the poor
● strengthening the capacity of the poor to compete
in the marketplace and to move up the value
addition chain
● redesigning budgetary policy to reach public
resources to the poor
● restructuring monetary policy to deliver credit
and provide savings instruments to the poor as
well as to acquire corporate assets
● designing institutions to enable the poor to
participate more productively in a market
economy
● enhancing the capacity of the poor tomake their
rightful claim on the services of the state
● empowering the poor to participate more fully
in the democratic process
● restructuring international institutions to
prioritise the concerns of the poor.
Rethinking aid strategies
Such a redirection in the strategy for poverty
alleviation remains part of a political process which
must originate from a deeply indigenous process
of policy debate andpublic action.Donors can assist
this process, but they cannot substitute for it.
Significantly enhancing aid flows to target themost
basic deprivations of the poor remains an important
commitment of the international community.
However, the critical issue beyond providing
mosquito nets and subsidised fertiliser for the poor
is to enhance their capacity to buy these essential
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needs from income generated by their participation
in the development process. This will require a
change not just in the level but in the perspectives
of aid policy. This willingness to rethink aid
strategies will indicate whether poverty eradication
derives from a sincere commitment of the
international community to strike at the sources of
the injustice which perpetuate poverty, or whether
aid is being provided to merely alleviate its
symptoms. Significantly expanding aid flows to the
LDCs and seeking improvements in their capacity
to absorb aid should, in this context, be seen as part
of a transitional process. The effective utilisation of
enhanced aid flows to the LDCs must, in the final
analysis, be directed to support the capacity of the
poor to challenge the injustices of a social and global
order which has condemned them to live on the
margins of society.
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